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My prof's email is down so the following are the papers that I couldn't send him. This was the easiest way to get it to him.
In her book, Virtues of the Mind, Part III, Linda Zagzebski explains her belief that her virtue theory escapes Gettier problems. She claims that any view of knowledge that holds that knowledge is truth plus something that doesn't entail truth will be subject to Gettier examples (Zagzebski 283). She says that the knowledge theories that involve warranted or justified belief are such theories that cannot escape Gettier problems.
For justified true belief, she gives the classic Gettier example of the disjunction: "Smith owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona." In this case, Ford gives someone by the name of Juniper evidence of his purchase of a Ford. Thus Juniper can conclude that the disjunction, "Smith owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona," is true since they are justified in believing that Smith owns a Ford, when, in fact, Smith is lying, but the disjunction is still true because Brown is, in fact, in Barcelona. Therefore, Juniper is justified in believing the disjunction but for the wrong reasons (284).
Zagzebski doesn't believe that Plantinga's theory of warranted belief escapes Gettier problems either. This theory is that a person is warranted in believing something to be true if the belief is formed by a properly functioning process in an appropriate environment.
Zagzebski points out that if a woman, Mary, has fairly good vision and sees what looks like her husband in a room, when, in fact, the man is her husband's brother who looks very much like her husband, then Mary is warranted in her belief that her husband is in the room. It turns out the husband is in the room after all, hiding around the corner, thus making this a Gettier example (286-287).
Rohrs, p. 2
So how does Zagzebski get around Gettier problems in virtue epistemology? She makes a parallel to virtue ethics. She gives the scenario of an Italian judge who finds a Mafia hit man guilty when he is actually innocent of the crime for which he is accused (294). In this case, the judge is acting with virtues in place such as justice and scrutiny, but nevertheless, he is mistaken. This is not an act of virtue and we would not say that the judge acted virtuously because we withhold a certain moral praise when success is not achieved. He did nothing wrong and he was virtuous but in spite of that we would not call his action an act of virtue because an act of virtue requires success. But even if the hit man were switched with the real culprit before sentencing, making this an ethical Gettier case, we would still withhold labeling this an act of virtue, even though the end result is good, because an act of virtue must be the result of a virtuous action rather than the result of an accident.
Zagzebski applies this to her virtue epistemology. Knowledge here is the result of an act of intellectual virtue and since acts of intellectual virtue cannot fail to provide knowledge without ceasing to be acts of intellectual virtue, they cannot be the subjects of Gettier examples. Zagzebski points out that a Gettier case occurs only when two mistakes occur, the first thwarting justification and the second leading to the result justification sought, as opposed to justification leading to it. Since the first mistake negating knowledge cannot happen without the loss of the designation of "epistemically virtuous," no Gettier problem can begin to arise. Without at least the possibility of failure, no Gettier case can occur.
In her book, Virtues of the Mind, Part III, Linda Zagzebski explains her belief that her virtue theory escapes Gettier problems. She claims that any view of knowledge that holds that knowledge is truth plus something that doesn't entail truth will be subject to Gettier examples (Zagzebski 283). She says that the knowledge theories that involve warranted or justified belief are such theories that cannot escape Gettier problems.
For justified true belief, she gives the classic Gettier example of the disjunction: "Smith owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona." In this case, Ford gives someone by the name of Juniper evidence of his purchase of a Ford. Thus Juniper can conclude that the disjunction, "Smith owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona," is true since they are justified in believing that Smith owns a Ford, when, in fact, Smith is lying, but the disjunction is still true because Brown is, in fact, in Barcelona. Therefore, Juniper is justified in believing the disjunction but for the wrong reasons (284).
Zagzebski doesn't believe that Plantinga's theory of warranted belief escapes Gettier problems either. This theory is that a person is warranted in believing something to be true if the belief is formed by a properly functioning process in an appropriate environment.
Zagzebski points out that if a woman, Mary, has fairly good vision and sees what looks like her husband in a room, when, in fact, the man is her husband's brother who looks very much like her husband, then Mary is warranted in her belief that her husband is in the room. It turns out the husband is in the room after all, hiding around the corner, thus making this a Gettier example (286-287).
Rohrs, p. 2
So how does Zagzebski get around Gettier problems in virtue epistemology? She makes a parallel to virtue ethics. She gives the scenario of an Italian judge who finds a Mafia hit man guilty when he is actually innocent of the crime for which he is accused (294). In this case, the judge is acting with virtues in place such as justice and scrutiny, but nevertheless, he is mistaken. This is not an act of virtue and we would not say that the judge acted virtuously because we withhold a certain moral praise when success is not achieved. He did nothing wrong and he was virtuous but in spite of that we would not call his action an act of virtue because an act of virtue requires success. But even if the hit man were switched with the real culprit before sentencing, making this an ethical Gettier case, we would still withhold labeling this an act of virtue, even though the end result is good, because an act of virtue must be the result of a virtuous action rather than the result of an accident.
Zagzebski applies this to her virtue epistemology. Knowledge here is the result of an act of intellectual virtue and since acts of intellectual virtue cannot fail to provide knowledge without ceasing to be acts of intellectual virtue, they cannot be the subjects of Gettier examples. Zagzebski points out that a Gettier case occurs only when two mistakes occur, the first thwarting justification and the second leading to the result justification sought, as opposed to justification leading to it. Since the first mistake negating knowledge cannot happen without the loss of the designation of "epistemically virtuous," no Gettier problem can begin to arise. Without at least the possibility of failure, no Gettier case can occur.