brightnorm
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Best theory for missing WMD\'s?
VIABLE THEORY FOR MISSING WMD's
I've copy/pasted the article for those who can't open the link
Brightnorm
By MICHAEL R. GORDON
AMP DOHA, Kuwait, Aug. 1 — There is a bold and entirely plausible theory that may account for the mystery over Iraq's missing weapons of mass destruction.
Saddam Hussein, the theory holds, ordered the destruction of his weapon stocks well before the war to deprive the United States of a rationale to attack his regime and to hasten the eventual lifting of the United Nations sanctions. But the Iraqi dictator retained the scientists and technical capacity to resume the production of chemical and biological weapons and eventually develop nuclear arms.
Mr. Hussein's calculation was that he could restart his weapons programs once the international community lost interest in Iraq and became absorbed with other crises. That would enable him to pursue his dream of making Iraq the dominant power in the Persian Gulf region and make it easier for him to deter enemies at home and abroad.
"This is the leading theory," said Gary Samore, director of studies at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies and a former nonproliferation expert on the National Security Council under President Bill Clinton.
American intelligence experts are still in Iraq trying to determine the status of Mr. Hussein's weapons programs, so it is premature to be too categorical about what they will find. What the theory offers, however, is a new way to make sense of the testimony of captured Iraqi officials who claim that weapons stocks were eliminated, Mr. Hussein's pattern of grudging and partial cooperation with United Nations weapons inspectors and his longstanding ambitions in the region.
If true, it means that the Iraqi threat was less immediate than the administration asserted but more worrisome than the critics now suggest. And it means the decision to use military force to pre-empt that threat was not an urgent necessity but a judgment call, one that can be justified as the surest way to put an end to Iraq's designs but still one about which ardent defenders of the United States' security can disagree.
It is already clear that much of the recent debate over Iraq's weapons programs has been too simplistic. In recent months, the discussion of Iraq's intentions seems to have oscillated from one extreme to another. Iraq was described by hawks before the war as a nation that was an imminent threat to the United States, bristling with chemical and biological weapons, or C.B.W., as intelligence agencies call them. Now the administration's critics seem to suggest that the absence of weapons stocks means that the Saddam Hussein regime had somehow abandoned its goal to be an assertive regional power.
Neither portrait seems accurate. Certainly, the portrait of Iraq that was initially put forward by the Bush administration appears to have overstated the immediacy of the danger. In building its case for pre-emptive military action, the White House suggested that Iraq had weapon stocks and could provide them to terrorists, who could use them to attack the United States. But American intelligence concluded that Mr. Hussein was unlikely to conspire with terrorists to attack America and would do so only if his regime was threatened. It now seems virtually certain that Iraq did not have the stocks to provide weapons of mass destruction, despite the Bush administration's repeated contention that it believes it will find them.
"Baghdad, for now, appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or C.B.W. against the United States," says the declassified version of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's weapons program, which was prepared in October. "Should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no longer be deterred he probably would become much less constrained in adopting terrorist actions."
Some of the technical analysis behind the White House charges was also challenged in the estimate. President Bush suggested in February that Iraq could launch drones with germ weapons from ships at sea and use them to attack the United States. While much of the American intelligence community supported that assessment, there was one notable exception: the intelligence arm of the United States Air Force, which has a real claim to expertise in this area since the Air Force has experience in operating advanced drones, also called unmanned aerial vehicles.
"The Director, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, U.S. Air Force, does not agree that Iraq is developing U.A.V.'s primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological warfare (C.B.W.) agents," the declassified version of the estimate notes. "The small size of Iraq's new U.A.V. strongly suggests a primary role for reconnaissance, although C.B.W. delivery is an inherent capability."
But while the White House presented the most alarming interpretation of the available intelligence, it is important to note that the dominant view within the American intelligence community was that Iraq in fact had stocks of poison gas, was continuing its effort to make germ weapons and desired to become a nuclear power. This was not a view that was intended only for public consumption. It was a strongly held assessment within the American military community.
The failure to uncover weapon stocks also does not mean that Iraq's hands were clean. Important questions remain. Why did Iraq only grudgingly accede to inspections under the threat of military invasion if it had nothing to hide? And why did it restrict access to its weapons scientists?
David Kay, a former United Nations weapons inspector who is involved in the American effort to unravel the mystery over Iraq's weapons programs, told Congress on Thursday that American intelligence specialists were making progress. He said that the Iraq Survey Group, which the administration has established to investigate the issue, will not present its findings until it has three types of evidence: multiple Iraqi sources, documents and physical proof.
In the meantime, a plausible theory is that the Iraqi dictator was trying to strike a subtle balance between averting a war and preserving Iraq's military options for the future. Destroying the stocks would deprive the United Nations Security Council of a reason to authorize military action to oust the regime, he calculated. But Mr. Hussein continued to believe that the programs were essential to his strategic ambition to dominate the Persian Gulf and to his efforts to fend off internal and external challenges to his rule.
The Shiites were well aware that Mr. Hussein's forces had gassed the Kurds and had more to fear from a regime armed with weapons of mass destruction than one that no longer possessed such stocks. Or so the theory goes.
It is possible, of course, that Mr. Hussein might have concluded he could accomplish those ends simply by maintaining a sense of ambiguity over his weapons efforts and not continuing the programs themselves. Some notable specialists, however, believe that Iraq was keeping open the option of getting back into the weapons game.
Robert J. Einhorn, a former top State Department official on weapons proliferation, says his hunch was that Mr. Hussein had been trying to preserve a "rapid reconstitution capability."
Amatzia Baram, an Israeli expert on Iraq and Mr. Hussein, has reached a similar conclusion. The Saddam Hussein regime, he said, seems to have ordered the destruction of its weapons stocks while retaining its cadre of nuclear scientists and forbidding them to leave the country.
"Was it only to retain his deterrence or also to keep the option for nuclearization later on?" Mr. Baram asks. "I think both. Saddam without a regional ambition is a reformed man, and I don't think he was reformed."
VIABLE THEORY FOR MISSING WMD's
I've copy/pasted the article for those who can't open the link
Brightnorm
By MICHAEL R. GORDON
AMP DOHA, Kuwait, Aug. 1 — There is a bold and entirely plausible theory that may account for the mystery over Iraq's missing weapons of mass destruction.
Saddam Hussein, the theory holds, ordered the destruction of his weapon stocks well before the war to deprive the United States of a rationale to attack his regime and to hasten the eventual lifting of the United Nations sanctions. But the Iraqi dictator retained the scientists and technical capacity to resume the production of chemical and biological weapons and eventually develop nuclear arms.
Mr. Hussein's calculation was that he could restart his weapons programs once the international community lost interest in Iraq and became absorbed with other crises. That would enable him to pursue his dream of making Iraq the dominant power in the Persian Gulf region and make it easier for him to deter enemies at home and abroad.
"This is the leading theory," said Gary Samore, director of studies at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies and a former nonproliferation expert on the National Security Council under President Bill Clinton.
American intelligence experts are still in Iraq trying to determine the status of Mr. Hussein's weapons programs, so it is premature to be too categorical about what they will find. What the theory offers, however, is a new way to make sense of the testimony of captured Iraqi officials who claim that weapons stocks were eliminated, Mr. Hussein's pattern of grudging and partial cooperation with United Nations weapons inspectors and his longstanding ambitions in the region.
If true, it means that the Iraqi threat was less immediate than the administration asserted but more worrisome than the critics now suggest. And it means the decision to use military force to pre-empt that threat was not an urgent necessity but a judgment call, one that can be justified as the surest way to put an end to Iraq's designs but still one about which ardent defenders of the United States' security can disagree.
It is already clear that much of the recent debate over Iraq's weapons programs has been too simplistic. In recent months, the discussion of Iraq's intentions seems to have oscillated from one extreme to another. Iraq was described by hawks before the war as a nation that was an imminent threat to the United States, bristling with chemical and biological weapons, or C.B.W., as intelligence agencies call them. Now the administration's critics seem to suggest that the absence of weapons stocks means that the Saddam Hussein regime had somehow abandoned its goal to be an assertive regional power.
Neither portrait seems accurate. Certainly, the portrait of Iraq that was initially put forward by the Bush administration appears to have overstated the immediacy of the danger. In building its case for pre-emptive military action, the White House suggested that Iraq had weapon stocks and could provide them to terrorists, who could use them to attack the United States. But American intelligence concluded that Mr. Hussein was unlikely to conspire with terrorists to attack America and would do so only if his regime was threatened. It now seems virtually certain that Iraq did not have the stocks to provide weapons of mass destruction, despite the Bush administration's repeated contention that it believes it will find them.
"Baghdad, for now, appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or C.B.W. against the United States," says the declassified version of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's weapons program, which was prepared in October. "Should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no longer be deterred he probably would become much less constrained in adopting terrorist actions."
Some of the technical analysis behind the White House charges was also challenged in the estimate. President Bush suggested in February that Iraq could launch drones with germ weapons from ships at sea and use them to attack the United States. While much of the American intelligence community supported that assessment, there was one notable exception: the intelligence arm of the United States Air Force, which has a real claim to expertise in this area since the Air Force has experience in operating advanced drones, also called unmanned aerial vehicles.
"The Director, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, U.S. Air Force, does not agree that Iraq is developing U.A.V.'s primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological warfare (C.B.W.) agents," the declassified version of the estimate notes. "The small size of Iraq's new U.A.V. strongly suggests a primary role for reconnaissance, although C.B.W. delivery is an inherent capability."
But while the White House presented the most alarming interpretation of the available intelligence, it is important to note that the dominant view within the American intelligence community was that Iraq in fact had stocks of poison gas, was continuing its effort to make germ weapons and desired to become a nuclear power. This was not a view that was intended only for public consumption. It was a strongly held assessment within the American military community.
The failure to uncover weapon stocks also does not mean that Iraq's hands were clean. Important questions remain. Why did Iraq only grudgingly accede to inspections under the threat of military invasion if it had nothing to hide? And why did it restrict access to its weapons scientists?
David Kay, a former United Nations weapons inspector who is involved in the American effort to unravel the mystery over Iraq's weapons programs, told Congress on Thursday that American intelligence specialists were making progress. He said that the Iraq Survey Group, which the administration has established to investigate the issue, will not present its findings until it has three types of evidence: multiple Iraqi sources, documents and physical proof.
In the meantime, a plausible theory is that the Iraqi dictator was trying to strike a subtle balance between averting a war and preserving Iraq's military options for the future. Destroying the stocks would deprive the United Nations Security Council of a reason to authorize military action to oust the regime, he calculated. But Mr. Hussein continued to believe that the programs were essential to his strategic ambition to dominate the Persian Gulf and to his efforts to fend off internal and external challenges to his rule.
The Shiites were well aware that Mr. Hussein's forces had gassed the Kurds and had more to fear from a regime armed with weapons of mass destruction than one that no longer possessed such stocks. Or so the theory goes.
It is possible, of course, that Mr. Hussein might have concluded he could accomplish those ends simply by maintaining a sense of ambiguity over his weapons efforts and not continuing the programs themselves. Some notable specialists, however, believe that Iraq was keeping open the option of getting back into the weapons game.
Robert J. Einhorn, a former top State Department official on weapons proliferation, says his hunch was that Mr. Hussein had been trying to preserve a "rapid reconstitution capability."
Amatzia Baram, an Israeli expert on Iraq and Mr. Hussein, has reached a similar conclusion. The Saddam Hussein regime, he said, seems to have ordered the destruction of its weapons stocks while retaining its cadre of nuclear scientists and forbidding them to leave the country.
"Was it only to retain his deterrence or also to keep the option for nuclearization later on?" Mr. Baram asks. "I think both. Saddam without a regional ambition is a reformed man, and I don't think he was reformed."
