The Titan: all looks lost

bykfixer

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It seems as though the folks in the craft that was trying to see the Titanic up close have perished. Last word I heard was they think the atmospheric pressure was more than the craft could withstand. A Canadian deep dive robot according to the US Coast guard has apparently found a debris field on the ocean floor near the Titanic.

May the 4 passengers and captain rest in peace.
 
I just read today that a former employee was raising concern about a window port of some kind that wasn't certified to the full depth, only about half as much. Guy ended up getting fired.

Seems like a classic case of people saying "It worked last time, so it's fine!"

But the key words there are "last time". That doesn't mean it'll work the NEXT time.

When playing Russian Roulette with the ol' six-shooter, you could in theory pull the trigger five times and be fine. Does that mean it's safe to pull the trigger a sixth time?

To be fair to the dead, that fault is a fundamental fault of human nature and there have been many many others before them who've made the same mistake.
 
The thinking now is that it instantly popped like a balloon only impoded and the occupants never knew what hit 'em. It seems they have found body shaped debris near the titanic that was not previously seen before this exploration took place.

Bummer.
 
There are times to question established scientific theories... but this was not one of them. Laminated materials (carbon fiber) don't do well in situations like this... they were warned multiple times and many engineers resigned from the company before this tragedy.
 
Now, i might be slightly callous when it comes to stuff like this but i can't find it in me to feel any sympathy for any of the people involved in this. Not because they aren't people, but because i've seen no redeeming qualities from any of them, rather the opposite. Willingly going into a glorified soda can with no safety checks worth a damn seems awful close to Darwin Award territory to me.
 
I am truly sorry for the people who put their faith in this guy (CEO), but I can assure you that I would never put my faith in anyone who made these statements (and I don't care to elaborate):

 
I just read today that a former employee was raising concern about a window port of some kind that wasn't certified to the full depth, only about half as much. Guy ended up getting fired.
So many corners were cut that the viewport is but one of the possible critical failure points.

As best I can tell...
  • Carbon fiber hull
    • It's fundamentally unsuited to the role
    • They had no means to inspect the hull for critical failures between dives
    • What monitoring they had could potentially provide mere milliseconds of warning of failure
  • Countless consumer-grade components were used throughout
    • A primary control interface was a freaking $10 wireless gaming controller
    • Otherwise a touchscreen and a single physical button (presumably "normal operating mode" and "ascend-only mode") was it for controls
    • No redundant controls to provide emergency manual control over systems
    • Marine ratings mean something since salt water is in the air around the sea and it causes subtle corrosion
  • Their sole means of communication to the support vessel was essentially a sonar modem; prolonged loss of contact had happened on at least one prior dive
  • The emergency ballast release system consisted of outboard steel pipes balanced on hooks; the plan for emergency ascent was to use the weight of the crew to roll the ship to one side then the other to drop them
  • No means to egress the sub without being hauled up onto the support vessel and the fore end being unbolted
I can assure you that I would never put my faith in anyone who made these statements (and I don't care to elaborate)
I suspect those statements were PR cover for a more unsavory reason: experienced professionals refused to go along with the planned design / operations model which may well have proven financially inconvenient to the business.
 
I also saw a news story quoting the CEO to the effect that he was breaking established norms but with sound (supposedly) engineering behind it. Apparently referring to the hull design of carbon fiber shell mated to titanium end-caps for the pressure hull.

From personal experiences at work I've seen it is very difficult to bond composite to metal like that and have it leak-free under high pressure.

About 10 years ago we tested wrapped carbon fiber pressure bottles that had bonded-in threaded bosses on the top and bottom for tubing connection points. We tested it with liquid nitrogen (LN2) and pressurized each one till it burst.

The bottles leaked like crazy around the metal bosses. One or two of them we couldn't even pressurize high enough to burst it because it was leaking too much!

So yeah, submarine built with the same metal-to-composite interface?? NO THANKS NOT ME.
 
I am truly sorry for the people who put their faith in this guy (CEO), but I can assure you that I would never put my faith in anyone who made these statements (and I don't care to elaborate):

The CEO's totally cavalier attitude is just over the top. His ego killed himself and the crew and the passengers. What an a**.
 
I also saw a news story quoting the CEO to the effect that he was breaking established norms but with sound (supposedly) engineering behind it. Apparently referring to the hull design of carbon fiber shell mated to titanium end-caps for the pressure hull.

From personal experiences at work I've seen it is very difficult to bond composite to metal like that and have it leak-free under high pressure.

About 10 years ago we tested wrapped carbon fiber pressure bottles that had bonded-in threaded bosses on the top and bottom for tubing connection points. We tested it with liquid nitrogen (LN2) and pressurized each one till it burst.

The bottles leaked like crazy around the metal bosses. One or two of them we couldn't even pressurize high enough to burst it because it was leaking too much!

So yeah, submarine built with the same metal-to-composite interface?? NO THANKS NOT ME.
How about how they were spreading the epoxy onto the ends of the tube and grooves in the metal rings by hand? If the wreckage can be recovered, I bet one point of failure will be that epoxy was too rigid and it cracked.

What I'd choose for gluing a join like that would be a high durometer urethane rubber. Stiff enough to not deform under the weight of the end caps and rings yet flexible enough to handle the differing amounts of compression during dives. Smooth-On makes all kinds of urethane rubbers, resins, and foams, and has a urethane bonding surface prep which will make them stick permanently to just about any surface.

So Ure-Bond II prep the surfaces, apply the liquid rubber with a special caulking gun that mixes the two parts at point of use with a static mixing nozzle, slide the ring into place, clean up urethane squeeze out. You're looking for squeeze out all around and for it to be uniform. That would indicate the ring is all the way in place and not crooked. I'd make up a sheet of the urethane material to the desired joint thickness and tack them onto the joint face with freshly mixed urethane. Those pieces would only need to be like 1/4" diameter x the joint thickness and being the same material the new urethane would bond to them perfectly.

The part of the procedure that would guarantee a flawless seal would be a special inner and outer containment for the join to seal to the titanium ring and the carbon fiber tube. First pull a vacuum then apply pressure. That would evacuate air from the seal then ensure any bubbles left are squished to nothing so there's no flaws to work back and forth from dive pressure cycles.

Most submersibles have a plug hatch which is very thick, with several seals. They're designed to be latched and unlatched from the inside or outside. At the surface they close just well enough to be water tight. As the submersible dives, the increasing water pressure pushed on the hatch and makes the seal tighter.

They're designed that way so that as soon as the submersible surfaces the crew can pop the hatch open for fresh air, unless the waves are too high. I assume most submersibles also have a fresh air vent that can be opened on the surface in such conditions.

Reynolds Metals Aluminaut was originally designed without an elevated tower with the hatch. During an early test with the hatch open it got swamped and sank. (This was the early 1960's when these things were still new, and there were no "50 year old white guys" with long experience in submersible design.) So they added one. For the next test, Aluminaut was top heavy and rolled upside down.

Aluminaut has been sitting in a Virginia museum for 53 years, waiting for someone with the $$$ it would require to check out, refurbish, and update to put it back in the water. With a safe working depth up to 15,000 feet, it could easily visit Titanic, with up to 7 people and a payload capacity of 6,000 pounds. I don't know if the people are included in the payload weight.

If nobody wants to do a This Old Submersible with Aluminaut, copy it. I'm sure there are newer aluminum alloys that could meet its performance with a wall thickness less than 6.5" and at less than its 80,000 pounds, or exceed its performance at the same weight.
 
IMG_9481.jpeg

This is metal for a reason.

IMG_9506.jpeg

This too.
 
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